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CONTACT: Lee Vela, (713) 684-4540

Fire Fighters Foundation of Houston Presents Life-Saving Equipment for Houston Fire Fighters

Houston, TX, April 25, 2008 - More than $99,000 worth of life-saving equipment was presented to the City of Houston Fire Department by the Fire Fighters Foundation of Houston at a presentation ceremony today. William E. King, president and chairman of the foundation, made the formal presentation to HFD Fire Chief Phil Boriskie. "The foundation's mission is to raise the funds necessary to make sure our fire fighters have the very best equipment to not only save the lives of our citizens but for the protection of the fire fighters themselves," King said. In accepting the equipment, Chief Boriskie praised the foundation for its generosity in meeting the ongoing needs of firefighters in the nation's 4th largest city. "We all recognize that fighting fires is dangerous work, and in saving other lives our brave firefighters face many hazards. The equipment you have provided us with today and in the past has saved, and will continue to save, many lives, and we truly appreciate your dedication to making sure we have what we need to do our job effectively," he said. The donated equipment, which was exhibited and demonstrated at the presentation event, includes: Thermal Imaging Cameras, which enable firefighters to see inside smoke filled environments. Thermal Imaging Cameras contain sensors that react to infrared energy from surrounding objects and convert the "thermal signature" to a visible image. As firefighters search building buildings, they use the cameras to locate victims who otherwise might go unnoticed. They can also be used to detect hidden fires and catch them before they spread. The foundation donated eight of these cameras for the department. E-Z-Radiocom II units, for fast, safe communication when a firefighter is in trouble. The foundation donated 32 of these units. Blitz Monitor, which is a small portable monitor that can be deployed by a single person. Blitz monitors are supplied by a 2 1/2" line and typically will flow up to 500 gallons per minute. The foundation donated four of these monitors. In addition, the foundation donated $2,500 each to the HFD's Valor Awards, Honor Guard, and Pipes and Drums organizations. The Fire Fighters Foundation of Houston is a nonprofit organization that provides non-governmental funding to Houston firefighters. Every year it purchases tools, technology and equipment to firefighters - filling the gap between the needs of the HFD and limited government funding. The foundation raises most of its funds through an annual gala, which is held Wortham Center every September 11th to commemorate the courage and dedication of the New York City fire fighters during the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on that day in 2001. This year's donation represents a $40,000 increase over last year's amount. For more information on the Houston Fire Fighters Foundation, visit www.fffhouston.com.

These days I find myself cringing when I hear media accounts that fraudulent and greedy mortgage brokers are responsible for all of the woes of the current housing bubble and the sub-prime defaults. I do so because the recriminations are an all too familiar echo of an earlier debacle. One to which I had a ring-side seat.

Many of you who have known me for some years know that shortly after law school I made the somewhat less-than-fortuitous career decision of joining a law firm that specialized in representing savings and loans. At the time it did not seem like a bad decision. The Houston real estate market was enjoying an unprecedented boom and the savings and loan industry had just been deregulated. Investors were clamoring to get into the business. Within a few years of joining the law firm, I began investing in savings and loans and related businesses. By 1986, notwithstanding that I had started with barely two nickels to rub together after working my way through law school, I had built a small, but respectable, business empire consisting of savings and loan holdings, title companies, and real estate investments. However, within a couple of years, everything I had built evaporated into thin air. The Houston market collapsed when the price of oil fell from over $34 per barrel in 1984 to $9 the next year. It did not recover to above $20 until 2002. Manufacturing jobs in the region fell by nearly 50% and for the first time in history Texans' personal income declined.

Bankruptcies in Houston tripled between 1983 and 1987. All but one of Texas' major banking holding companies failed. Harris County's population actually declined from 1985 to 1989. It was the first and only time in Houston's history that it has lost population. If you did not live through these times, the magnitude of melt down is hard to imagine.

It is certainly difficult to lose everything that you have worked for, but the environment that existed in the late 1980s and early 1990s had an even more ominous aspect. As the public became increasingly aware that the savings and loan crisis was going to take a major taxpayer bailout, there were ever more strident cries to hold someone responsible.

The complexity of confluence of interest rates, regulatory policy, oil prices, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the collapse of large portions of the real estate market that actually explained the collapse was too great to be reduced to sound bites. Politicians and bureaucrats began pointing the finger at those in the industry, and soon, the "S&L crook" was born. And there were enough egregious cases for the politicians and bureaucrats to hold up as "proof" of their argument that the "S&L crooks" caused the crisis.

The proposition that fraud and insider abuse had sunk the savings and loan industry was eventually discredited. In 1993, a National Commission concluded that fraud had caused less than 15% of the total problem. But in the heat of the moment, there was little interest in cool, scholarly reflection on the problems of the industry.

As the 1980s came to a close I watched as many friends, associates and former clients in the S&L industry were swept up in a maelstrom of civil and criminal litigation. Naively, it never occurred to me that I might be caught up in such a dispute as well. But I was.

Eventually, I prevailed in my battle with the regulators, but as you might imagine, it was an experience that left an indelible mark and from which it took me many years to recover. For some time I have been jotting down notes for a book about these experiences. For a couple of reasons, I recently decided to finalize such a book.

First, as many of you know, I am considering a candidacy for mayor of Houston in 2009. We all know too well that "negative campaigning" has become the standard today. Certainly going bankrupt in the savings and loan business will provide potential opponents ready ammunition. So first and foremost, I want to put the issue squarely on the table. If I decide to become a candidate, there will undoubtedly be some voters who will be troubled by these experiences. Some will believe difficult times such as the ones I went through are a crucible that better prepares a person for leadership. Most, I expect, will simply want to be advised of the facts so that they can be weighed with other issues bearing on their decision.

But beyond the potential political implications, the troubling similarities between what I saw in the S&L collapse of the 1980s and the sub-prime crisis playing out before us now demands some consideration. It is a well worn adage, but nonetheless true, that if we do not learn from our history, we are doomed to repeat our mistakes. Perhaps relating what I saw during the saving and loan industry collapse will provide some perspective on the current financial crises.

So for these reasons I have written Saving Face: An Alternative and Personal Account of the Savings and Loan Debacle. I have attempted in the book to tell the story of what I experienced during these times, but at the same time, to place my experiences in a larger, national context. I believe my story has some relevance to anyone experiencing trying times generally, and certainly to those in the Houston real estate industry, many of whom lived through these times as I did.

You can learn more about Saving Face at www.AboutSavingFace.com. Also, we are hosting a book signing at Tony's (3755 Richmond) on April 24 from 5:00-7:00pm. We would love to see you there. Proceeds from this event will go to a donation to The Innocence Project.

If you cannot make the book signing, but would like a purchase a copy of the book, you can do so at the website or on www.Amazon.com. Just search for "William King Saving Face." As always, if you have any thoughts on this subject you would like to share, I would love to hear from you.

Recent polls show that most Houstonians feel that crime is the most pressing problem we face as a community today. Also, the media daily floods our papers and televisions with accounts of what seems to be rampant crime. Because of this concern, I decided to get the crime statistics for the last eight years to see what the actual numbers looked like. I filed an Open Records request with the Houston Police Department (HPD) for its annual reports to the FBI and then analyzed some of the most significant data from those in an Excel spreadsheet. The following is a summary of that data. You can review the actual reports at BillKingHouston.com and the spreadsheet at HPD Summary Crime Reports .

A review of this data helps us to understand some of the public’s concern about crime. In laying out these data, I am not suggesting that anyone or any organization is to blame or responsible for these conditions. The incidence of crime is due to many complicated factors. Many of the reasons crime ebbs and surges is not in the control of the police or local officials. However, I think that if we are to rationally address this problem, the first thing we need to do is to understand where we are. I would be curious to hear your thoughts on these statistics and what actions you think they suggest we should be taking.

Crime “Rates” vs. Total Number of Crimes

When officials discuss crime statistics they will typically refer to crime “rates.” The crime rate is derived by dividing the actual number of crimes by the population. Typically, crime rates are stated in the number of incidents per 100,000 of population. For example, in 2007 there were 24,574 violent crimes committed in Houston. The official estimated population for 2007 was 2,231,335. The violent crime rate was 1,101.3, calculated as follows:

24,574 ÷ (2,231,335 ÷ 100,000) = 1,101.3
Therefore, the crime rate is not only affected by the actual number of crimes committed but also any change in population from year to year. It is important to note that the population is only “counted” every 10 years when the U.S. Census is conducted. In the intervening years official estimates are used. Both the crime rate and the total number of actual crimes are important indicators. Clearly, as any city grows, the total number of crimes committed is also likely to grow. If the total number of crimes remains the same or even increases, but at a rate slower than population is growing, that would indicate some success in reducing crime.

Historical Context

A review of recent crime rate trends must be set against a larger historical perspective. Crime rates in the U.S., and especially violent crime rates, have been dramatically declining since the 1970s. For example, in 1980, 654 murders were committed in Houston. Our population at that time was about 1.6 million, resulting in a murder rate of about 41 per 100,000 residents. By 2001, murders in Houston had dropped by over 60% to 230. However, during that same time our population had grown to just under 2 million, resulting in a murder rate under 12, a 70% decline.

However, the crime rate in Houston appears not to have declined over the last several decades as rapidly as it has in most other large U.S. cities. As a result, at least according to the FBI reports, Houston now compares unfavorably with these cities. In 2006, Houston ranked No. 3 in violent crimes among the ten largest cities in the U.S. and No. 4 in property crimes. Houston’s violent crime rate was 48% higher than Los Angeles and 83% higher than New York City. It should be noted that these comparisons come from reports filed by local police departments with the FBI. It is possible that there are significant differences in the way the data is collected and reported from one city to the next which could result in overstating or understating comparisons. For a number of reasons, HPD feels strongly that the comparisons to New York or Los Angeles, in particular, are not “apples to apples” comparisons.

Recent Uptick in Crime

The decline in crime rates (i.e. per capita rates) in Houston bottomed out around 2001. Since then crime rates in most categories have experienced modest increases, with some indications of a small improvement in 2007. Mayor White has recently stated in several speeches that the violent crime rate has declined by 8% during his administration. Many people I have talked to have expressed surprise that violent crime has declined in recent years. The disconnect may have to do with the difference between the crime rate and the total number of crimes. Mayor White is correct in his statement that the violent crime rate has declined. As the chart below shows, in 2003, the last year of the Brown administration, the violent crime rate was 1,185. By 2007, that rate had declined to 1,101, an 8% decrease, with most of the improvement coming in 2007.


While a reduction in the violent crime rate is an important indication of some improvement, as shown by the following chart, the actual number of violent crimes increased substantially in 2001 and 2002, eased somewhat in 2003 and 2004, but has steadily risen since then. The significant reduction in the 2007 violent crime rate was the result not of total violent crimes decreasing but rather from a significant increase in the estimated Houston population (2,085,000 to 2,231,000).



Troubling Trend in Robbery & Burglary

In some crimes, such as murder, the victim and the perpetrator are frequently acquainted. In fact, often they are related. However, robbery is a crime that almost always occurs between strangers and it places the life of the victim in jeopardy. It is normally a random crime of opportunity catching the victim when he or she is most off guard. Similarly, burglaries compromise the security of our homes or businesses. Burglaries that occur at night when the family is at home are particularly frightening. As a result, robbery and burglary are among the crimes we find most threatening. As shown in the chart below, over the last eight years, we have seen a troubling increase in the robbery rate, rising from 425 in 2000 to 514 in 2007, a 17% increase. 2007 showed a significant improvement over the 2006 rate of 582, however the 2007 rate was still 27% higher than 2000.


The actual number of robberies has risen at a fairly steady pace, increasing 28% over the eight year period. Most of that increase occurred between 2000 and 2002.


A similar pattern is seen in burglaries. The per capita burglary rate in Houston increased substantially in 2001-2002 and has held fairly steady since then.


The actual number of burglaries has been on a steady increase since 2000, with 2007 registering the largest increase (2,175) during the eight-year period.



Overall Rates Not as Bad

The silver lining in these reports is that the overall crime rates have held fairly steady. The FBI reports are divided into two general categories. There is a group of serious offenses they categorize as “Part I” offenses. “Part II” offenses are less serious. In looking at both the Part I offenses and the total of all offenses, the rates topped out in 2002 and have steadily declined ever since, posting the largest reduction in 2007.



(Note: The “All Crimes Rate” includes some factors that may cause anomalous results. For example, some officers I have talked to indicated that if they had the time, they could make thousands more DUI arrests. The same is true of minor drug offenses. Therefore, to some extent, the enforcement practices of HPD drive the number of the Part II offenses.)

Alarming “Clearance” Rates

Probably the most alarming statistic in these reports is something referred to as the “clearance” rate. As a general proposition, this number represents the number of cases in which a suspect is arrested and charged with a crime. A small number of cases are closed for other reasons, such as the alleged victim withdrawing their complaint. Also, this statistic does not track whether that person is ultimately convicted; that is, whether the right person was arrested. But in a loose sense it represents those cases which HPD considers “solved.” The following chart tracks the clearance rates for this eight-year period for all violent crimes. First, I found it fairly depressing that the best rate achieved over the eight year period was less than 40%. Even more depressing is the fact that the clearance rate for violent crimes has steadily gone down, reaching a low of 24% in 2005. The rate has only slightly improved since.


But the clearance rate for robbery and burglary, two crimes most of us find most problematic, are truly abysmal. In 2000 only 24% of robberies were solved. By 2005, that rate had sunk to 16% with marginal improvement in 2006 and 2007. Amazingly, throughout the eight-year period, over 92% of all burglaries were never solved.



The clearance for all crimes shows a similar story, with the vast majority of crimes going unsolved. One glimmer of good news is that the rate improved in 2007 for the first time in three years. An interesting question is how these rates compare to other cities. Hopefully, we will be able to track that information down.



Police District Data on the Way

The City is divided into about a dozen police districts. When we got the crime reports from HPD for the entire City, we also got them for each police district. We are in the process of inputting that data and plan to send out an e-mail in the next few weeks analyzing how crime is dispersed around the City.

Conclusion

I think these data show why crime is on the minds of citizens in our community. I think it also suggests that we have a great deal of work to do. Most of you are probably aware that the HPD is severely undermanned by any objective standard. The Iraq war has diminished the number of young people leaving the military which is normally a major source of HPD recruits. The investigative ranks have been particularly hard hit with a large number of officers retiring in the last several years. I think there is also general agreement that we inherited some of New Orleans’ crime problems in the Katrina evacuation.

Nonetheless, there are reasons for some optimism as indicated by the improvement in some categories of crime in 2007. The Mayor announced a plan to add 500 new officers over the next several years and established special Crime Reduction Units that aggressively police problem areas. Also, it appears that most of the New Orleans’ gangs that transplanted here for a while have decided to go home. However, more must be done. Public safety is the basic and essential element of our quality of life. Further the unfavorable comparisons readily accessible on the Internet between the crime rates in Houston and other major cities do nothing to enhance our community’s image nationally. Addressing this problem is job one!